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shares his sympathies with the truly "rigged" and downtrodden and yet wonders
how many doubtful characters got off on cleverly detected technicalities. A
reviewer, of course, should soft-pedal judgment on the ethics of showmanship of
the subjects of biographies, leaving such judgment to the curious reader; in the
case of these particular volumes, however, subject matter and over-all writing
effect are sometimes inextricably tangled and to separate moral from esthetic
appraisal is often difficult.
Under reasons for reading biography and qualities a biography should have,
the writing of Brown, Wallace, Noble, and Averbuch would qualify on many
counts: human interest, drama, anecdotes, aliveness, and so on. There are even
lessons to be drawn, though the codes are modein codes in two of the books,
uncomfortable at times. The writing generally is competent or better, informal,
journalistic, non-literary. This is modem writing about modem people for modem readers. The great legal biographies-the studies of Marshall and Holmes
that every lawyer knows-are not going to be displaced by the new brisk reporting jobs. There is room on the shelf for the traditional and the new, a time for
one and a time for the other. On most counts these three volumes acquit themselves adequately or better. They most certainly are not dull reading.
WiLmAm

H. DAVENPORT*

Professor of English, University of Southern California.

The Public Philosophy. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1955. Pp. 189. $3.50.
This book is indisputably a tract for the times. It states a disorder to be
found at the very center of free government, and it proposes a remedy for the
restoration of order. This disorder is not a superficial maladjustment nor a fleeting muddle, it goes to the heart of the matter, and the author identifies it with
a process he calls "The Decline of the West." To arrest these distempers and
to remove the causes of present discontents, Mr. Lippmann, recognizing that
tinkerings with, or repairs to, the machinery of government are not enough,
proposes a political philosophy which he calls "The Public Philosophy." Hence
the form of the argument requires that the philosophy be commensurate with
and relevant to the disorder, while the test of the argument lies in the equivalence between the discord described and the vigor and cogency of the proposed
restorative. Nothing less than "thoughts that breathe and words that bum" can
reverse "The Decline of the West."
The fracture in the institutions of the West that brought on its present
perils appeared during the First World War, and was revealed in what the author calls, "The Paralysis of Governments."' This is nothing less than an
incapacity in'foreign affairs, where government is unable to "wage war for
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rational ends" or "make a peace which would be observed or could be enforced," 2 and an internal "functional derangement of the relationship between
the mass of the people and the government."' Since these symptoms, already
observable in the period of the First World War, have become accentuated
and aggravated in the Second World War and the semi-war and pretense of
peace following it, they give notice of some continuing and deepening political
dissonance.
Democracies, Mr. Lippmann alleges, are immoderate in the conduct of war;
they perversely refuse to prepare in the face of danger, yet once embarked upon
the unprevented war they become so seduously occupied with gaining victory
that they as perversely refuse to think upon a program of peace that is founded
upon the realities of international politics and principles related thereto. At
first they substitute vain auto-suggestions for a program of peace, as after 1918
and 1945; later, when faced with the contradictions between their professed
ideals and the actual decisions compelled by events, they simply improvise uneasily and without principles. The cause of this incoherency arises in part from
the wartime relationship between government and people. Governments, in
order to command the sacrifices necessary for war, present the enemy in the
image of "evil incarnate, as absolute and congenital wickedness." 4 This creates
a mood antithetical to peace negotiations. Moreover, the exertions needed for
victory are so strenuous that not only must the danger be made imminent but
the fruits of victory must be pictured in the idiom of a majestic vision to be
entered upon immediately. Hence the disillusions and maladroitness of the
democratic progress through the cycle of war and peace; the lethargy of prewar peace is transformed to an intemperate war fury; while noble ideals of
post-war peace are presented as too immediately realizable.
From this scene of "too little too late" and "too much too soon" in the conduct of war and foreign policy, Mr. Lippmann turns to consider "The Derangement of Powers"6 between the governors and the governed. A distinction is
made between "The People"8 defined "as a community of the entire living
population, with their predecessors and successors," 7 and the people as voters.
The author warns that the people "as the corporate nation"" and the people
as an electoral body are not identical. This most critical distinction within the
whole concept of democracy, redolent with political implications, might well
have received extended treatment. In a sense it is the fundamental problem of
the philosophy and mechanics of representative government. This is the
2
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principal topic of this section of the book; this is the central concern of practical
democracy.
The people, having acquired the power of governance, are, in Mr. Lippmann's
opinion, now incapable of exercising it. "They can elect the government. They
can remove it. They can approve or disapprove its performance. But they cannot administer the government." 9 In short, they can only give or withhold
consent to being governed. But mass opinion, although unable to exercise the
power of government, does dominate the government, and this leads to "a
morbid derangement of the true functions of power."' The inability of "the
people" to govern, the author asserts, arises not from the mechanism of representation but from an inability to discriminate the public interest. The "public
interest may be presumed to be what men would choose if they saw clearly,
thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently."" But can public
policy ever be quite so detached from the subjectivities of communal living?
Do not these rational men seeking the public interest possess a family resemblance to the eighteenth century law-of-nature political man seeking liberty
in abstract principles? Public policy, in fact, as Mr. Lippmann recognizes, resuits from a balancing of choices, and the vulnerability of popular choices is
2
that "the pressure of the electorate is normally for the soft side."'
Mr. Lippmann finds the essential derangement in the upset of the proper
balance between the representative part and the executive. The representative
part should make proposals of its own, veto proposals of the executive; in short,
perform the function of consent to governance. But now this is reversed, for
the executive rests on "a total dependence upon the assemblies and the mass
electorate" while the assemblies or mass electorates having "acquired the
monopoly of effective powers"' 3 cannot, by their very nature, govern. Moreover, the executive has lost the imponderable "divinity that doth hedge a king"
influence, so not only is it too enfeebled to initiate government but it is too
undignified to compel a respectful awe. Hence an excess of haphazard political
action accompanies a paralysis of government.
A distinction in the process of constitutional government based upon the
difference between the political and the legal functions, instead of between the
executive and representative parts, might have pointed more directly to "The
Public Philosophy" remedy suggested in the second part of the book. The
problem of controlling the power of government through law is not essentially
altered by the substitution in modern times of political control of the executive
for the medieval method of surrounding political power with legal frontiers.
The medieval jurists recognized that government comprised two elements: a
political and a legal. While they knew that political power could not be checked
9P.14.
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by law, they possessed the acuteness to provide a constitutional means for controlling power by surrounding it with legal limitations. Thus the conflict between law and politics took place on the terminal frontiers between them.
Modern constitutional government must be exercised politically within its
institutions through representative devices, and legally (or constitutionally)
through the delimitations of the area of authority of the several governing
bodies. A public philosophy designed to restore order to constitutional government must, therefore, suggest a system of public law institutions of limited
legal competences through which the political power operates. Unless such a
scheme of legal limitations so refines the actions of government that various
intermediate authorities intercept the direct popular will and immediate political action, we are left in the hapless condition of beseeching assemblies and
executives alike to be reasonable. But, as Mr. Lippmann points out, an assembly in the circumstances of government today cannot be reasonable; and
a fortiori neither can the executive. This is the difference between popular and
republican forms of government, and the crisis today arises somewhat from the
fact that representative assemblies have become like popular assemblies. Nor
is this only a current problem; it troubled Madison in 1787.14
The weakness of free government has provoked what Mr. Lippmann calls
the "totalitarian counterrevolution." Significantly, "The adversaries of Liberal
Democracy"' 5 are types of direct and unrepresentative government: Jacobinism
and Leninism-the rule of the many that is inevitably the rule of a self-appointed few, and the rule of the few, acknowledged and avowed, over the many.
To meet the internal weakness of democracy and to overcome its alien enemies,
Mr. Lippmann proposes in the second part of his book "The Public Philosophy."
Although there are many statements of public philosophy, the author
declares the "fundamental principle common to all of them" to be Cicero's
assertion that law is the bond of civil society. He specifies this to mean, "that
all men, governors and the governed, are always under, are never above, laws;
that these laws can be developed and refined by rational discussion, and that
the highest laws are those upon which all rational men of good will, when fully
informed, will tend to agree." 6 This, of course, is natural law, and Mr. Lippmann so affirms. 17 And natural law is not something to be shunned; it is not
politically leprous. But the concept requires some specificity if it is to avoid the
taint of speciousness. The schools of natural law are numerous; it has been
professed to support the status quo (notably in the seventeenth century), as
well as to justify revolution (notably in the eighteenth century). These protean
shapes do not deny the existence of a generic archetype; but when we rely upon
the idea of natural law to accomplish a purpose in political society, whether
14The Federalist No. X.
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that be of stability'or of renovation, it must be shown to have a contingent
fittingness.
Natural law, in the traditional eighteenth century sense accepted in this
book, presented two stark institutions over and against each other: the State
and the People. It showed no hospitality toward intermediate institutions; it
found no place in its contractual system for the corporate associations that
offered a horizontal resistance to the pyramidal thrust of the State. It might
well be asked whether the derangement of powers was not implicit in the
democratic natural law of the eighteenth century. Assuming that natural law,
in its most generic form, speaks to our condition, yet only its institutional correlations can contend with our situation. Reference to the stoic cosmopolitan
administration of Alexander's empire, 18 which was topped with divinity, and
to the Roman lawyers 19 is not enough to make the public philosophy intelligible
in terms of the present crisis. This will not luminously dispel what Mr. Lippmann graphically calls "The Eclipse of the Public Philosophy."20
Examples of the public philosophy are ventured in a chapter entitled, "The
Renewal of the Public Philosophy."'" The first refers to the theory of property,
and the inconsistency to be found in Blackstone between his assertion of the
Roman dominuinm of sole and despotic control, and the social derivation of title
and rights. Mr. Lippmann suggests that the social theory of property conforms
to the public philosophy 2 This appears to be somewhat repugnant to the
natural law theories of property expressed by Locke, Pufendorf and Rousseau.
But theories of property do not touch the central issue of the derangement of
power. A more pertinent inconsistency in Blackstone might produce fruitful
reflection, namely that between the solemn declaration of government limited
by natural law with the equally emphatic, if less solemn, statement of unlimited
parliamentary supremacy.
Another example selected to elucidate the public philosophy is the right of
freedom of speech2 3 Socrates, Milton, and J. S. Mill are all vouched for the
usual warranties. "The borderline," Mr. Lippmann declares, "between sedition
and radical reform is between the denial and the acceptance ...of the public
philosophy; that we live in a rational order in which by sincere inquiry and rational debate we can distinguish the true and the false, the right and the
wrong. '2 4 As the statement of a principle this is excellent, but as an elucidation
of the public philosophy it falters. For the purpose surely of the public philosophy is to create such a rational order. Unless the public philosophy can create
a political habitation it cannot be more than a spirit afloat. Formalism as a
method for analysis, as an instrument for making distinctions, as a means for
1
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precision of terms contributes to clarity and gives ordonnance to a scheme of
thought. But formalism, lacking in embodiment, cannot be a solution to concrete problems. Formalism is the deadly virus affecting this exposition of the
public philosophy. Even a section entitled, "Constitutionalism Made Concrete" 25 repeats again the idea that the "first principle of a civilized state is
that power is legitimate only when it is under contract. '2 This requires an
institutional clarification bottomed upon much comparative constitutional
history and law before it can be usable for present purposes.
The concept of natural law unavoidably raises the tension between law and
morals, which is discussed under the sign of "The Two Realms." 27 References
are made to this tension under various aspects: existence and essence, the law
and the prophets, balance of powers, church and state. We are warned that the
"root of the error is the confusion of the two realms, '28 and told that reconciliation rests upon the use of "the technique of the balance of power. 21 9 When it
"is used as an instrument of aggression and defense" among rivals it is bad; but
when it "intends to regulate all the rivalries," and "is used as the structural
principle of public order in the good society" it can claim moral sanction. 0
Since the public philosophy as here presented is more of a mood than a
system of law or government, a reliance upon education becomes its most
assured support. Several passages 3 affirm the necessity for exhortation of the
public philosophy to secure intellectual allegiance to it.
The incommensurateness between the crisis described and the program for
overcoming it creates a genuine disappointment. This vexing hour needs more
than a tract for the times to arrest attention and intimate a principle of health.
It requires grave works with apposite erudition that project a modus operandi
into the tangled thickets of government. The remedies to our present distempers do not lie in the eighteenth century origins of our harassed political
systems, but in the associational societies that lie behind the eighteenth century.
Crevices in our system of government, and the resultant derangement of
power, have their origins in eighteenth century modes of government which do
not fit our society, which politically exhibits qualities of mass democracy while
in substance it is becoming increasingly associational. And the stress between
the social and economic facts of association and political institutions devised
under eighteenth century auspices for a society of individuals distorts the
eighteenth century organization of power. An inquiry into these distempers
ought to propose institutional answers; appeals to sentiment, in the late
eighteenth century manner, are not enough. Such an inquiry should probe
deeply into the history of public law. It should traverse areas of complex
25Pp. 166-71.
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constitutional theory in medieval western Europe: the fifteenth century
Englishman Fortescue; the sixteenth century French writers like de Seyssel
and Charondas; the theory of offices in the writings of the Italians, Bartolus
and Alciatus; the seventeenth century German writers like Hugo, Althusius,
Nettlebladt and Besold. It should look closely at administrative practices. And
in the seventeenth century struggle between the State and the Estates in Austria
and the Empire, and in the nineteenth century struggle between the State and
Nationalism in central Europe, such an inquiry would find much that is relevant
to domestic as well as to international problems today. From such and similar
sources will be recaptured the public philosophy with a correlative scheme of
institutions of government.
While we appreciate Mr. Lippmann's warning signals, we must even more
regret that they are not likewise beacons to light our laborious way through the
history and philosophy of public law so that at length the public philosophy,
that lies embedded therein, would become a body of intelligible principles with
which we could master the political mischances of our time.
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